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  Federal deductibility for state and local taxes constitutes one of the largest tax 
expenditures in the federal budget and provides a significant source of federal support to 
state and local governments.  Deductibility was restricted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
by removing the deduction for general sales taxes.   More recently the President's 
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform recommended eliminating the deduction 
altogether as one of several revenue-raising initiatives to finance comprehensive tax 
reform.   
 
  I carry out a number of distributional analyses – considering both variation across 
income and across states – of the subsidy from deductibility as well as the distributional 
impact of potential partial reforms.  In addition, I consider three counterfactuals for 2004 
– a tax system without the Bush tax cuts for 2001 and 2003, a tax system without the 
2004 AMT patch, and a tax system without the AMT – to see how the benefits of 
deductibility are affected by these changes in the tax law. 
 
  Next I consider how behavioral responses affect the tax expenditure estimates.  
Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) argued that tax expenditures overestimate the revenue gain 
from eliminating deductibility as they do not take into account a likely shift away from 
once-deductible taxes to non-deductible taxes and fees in the absence of deductibility.  
Many of these latter taxes and fees are paid by businesses.  As business costs rise, federal 
business tax collections would fall, offsetting some of the gains of ending deductibility.  
Feldstein and Metcalf also found that ending deductibility would have little if any impact 
on state and local spending itself.  Using a large panel of data on state and local 
governments, I revisit this issue and find that the Feldstein-Metcalf results are robust to 
adding more years of analysis.   
 
 
*   *   * 
 
  This paper was prepared for the NBER Conference on Incentive and 
Distributional Consequences of Tax Expenditures, held at the Hyatt Regency Coconut 
Point Hotel in Bonita Springs, FL on March 28-29, 2008.  I am grateful for help with 
TAXSIM calculations from Dan Feenberg, for expert RA work from Yoshiyuki Miyoshi, 
and for helpful comments from Roger Gordon and other conference participants.   I. Introduction 
  One of the most valuable deductions on the individual income tax return is the 
deduction for state and local income and property taxes.  Taking all state and local tax 
deductions as a group, the deduction is second only to the deduction for mortgage interest 
on owner occupied homes in aggregate importance for individual taxpayers (Office of 
Management and Budget (2008)).  This deduction has come under attack at various times 
despite its widespread popularity.  The most serious threat came in the run-up to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.  While the elimination of the entire deduction for state and local 
taxes was proposed, TRA86 only removed the deduction for general sales taxes.  And this 
curtailment was undone to some extent in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 when 
the option was allowed to deduct either income or sales taxes.
1  This deduction came 
under scrutiny again by President George W. Bush's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform.  The panel argued that ending this deduction would contribute to a "cleaner and 
broader tax base" and a tax system that was more equitable across income groups.
2 
  While the Panel's recommendations remain to be taken up by Congress, this 
deduction has been eroded to some extent by two features of the federal tax code.  First, 
limitations on itemized deductions reduce the value of this deduction for some 
households with large amounts of itemized deductions.  Second, the Alternative 
Minimum Tax (AMT) targets this deduction directly.  In fact, a major determinant of 
whether a taxpayer becomes subject to the AMT is the presence of large deductions for 
state and local taxes.  A taxpayer facing the AMT loses this deduction. 
                                                 
1   This primarily benefitted those states with a general sales tax but no income tax: Florida, Nevada, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. 
2   See President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005).  The quote is from page 83 of the report.   2
  The magnitude of the tax expenditure for state and local tax deductions makes it a 
prime target for policy makers looking for revenue to pay for other changes in the tax 
code.
3  Feldstein and Metcalf (1987), however, argued that estimates of the revenue gain 
from eliminating deductibility were too high as they did not take into account a likely 
shift away from once-deductible taxes to non-deductible taxes and fees in the absence of 
deductibility.  Many of these latter taxes and fees are paid by businesses.  As these costs 
rise, federal business tax collections would fall, offsetting some of the gains of ending 
deductibility.  Feldstein and Metcalf also found that ending deductibility would have little 
if any impact on state and local spending itself. 
  Given the interest in changing or eliminating this subsidy, I present a number of 
distributional analyses – considering both variation across income and across states – of 
the subsidy from deductibility.  In particular I show that eliminating the deduction or 
curtailing it adds progressivity to the federal income tax.  In addition, I consider three 
counterfactuals for 2004 – a tax system without the Bush tax cuts for 2001 and 2003, a 
tax system without the 2004 AMT patch, and a tax system without the AMT – to see how 
the benefits of deductibility are affected by these changes in the tax law.  Then I consider 
how behavioral changes affect the tax expenditure estimates.  Using a large panel of data 
on state and local governments, I revisit this issue and find that the Feldstein-Metcalf 
results are robust to adding more years of analysis.  
  The regressive nature of the subsidy combined with its inability to stimulate 
overall state and local spending makes a strong case for removing the deduction.  One 
might make a case for the subsidy on the grounds that it serves as a type of commodity 
subsidy for certain state and local services that could be optimal in a world with 
                                                 
3   Congressional Budget Office (2008) provides a good history of this deduction and efforts to change it 
over time.  It also carries out a number of distributional analyses similar in spirit to those in this paper.   3
limitations on the ability to tax labor income sufficiently flexibly (the general case for 
violating production efficiency is given in Stiglitz (1982) and Naito (1999)).  Whether the 
institutional restrictions on income tax design are sufficient to support a subsidy to state 
and local taxes is not entirely clear.  Saez (2004), however, argues that in the long-run 
production efficiency can be restored in models where it appears that commodity taxes or 
subsidies are part of an optimal tax system.  Thus it is difficult to find support for this 
deduction on equity or efficiency grounds  
II. Background 
  The deduction for state and local taxes is a significant form of federal aid to state 
and local governments.  In the most recent budget submission, the deductions for all non-
business state and local taxes amounts to nearly $50 billion in FY2009, making it the fifth 
largest tax expenditure in the federal budget (Office of Management and Budget (2008)).  
While state and local tax deductibility dates to the creation of the modern income tax, it 
became a major focus of research activity in the mid-1980s when President Ronald 
Reagan proposed to eliminate the deduction as part of the first tax reform proposal in late 
1984.  The final legislation, The Tax Reform Act of 1986, ultimately eliminated the 
deduction for general sales taxes.  Many felt that this was not especially controversial as 
most taxpayers used sales tax look-up tables which, from an individual taxpayer's point 
of view, did not necessarily appear related to their own spending. 
  Early research on this topic focused on the role that deductibility played in 
encouraging state and local spending.  After all, one of the rationales for the deduction is 
to support spending at the sub-national level that might have significant spillover effects 
into other jurisdictions.  Spending on public parks, for example, by one community might 
benefit members of other communities who could enjoy the park.  In other words, state   4
and local spending could have important positive externalities or be public goods.  In the 
absence of federal intervention, it was argued that state and local governments were 
unlikely to provide the optimal amount of these goods and services.
4  Early papers in this 
literature include Noto and Zimmerman (1983, (1984), and Ladd (1984).  Attention was 
increasingly paid to the mix of taxes chosen as well as the level of spending.  
Zimmerman (1983) provided a median voter analysis of the relationship of income tax 
reliance on deductibility while Hettich and Winer (1984) provided a political economy 
analysis.  Neither paper was successful at finding a economically sensible relationship 
between deductibility and tax reliance. 
  Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) employed an average voter framework to analyze 
the impact of deductibility on state and local spending and tax reliance.  Their innovation 
was to use the IRS Public Use Files with the NBER's tax calculator, TAXSIM, to 
estimate average marginal tax prices for state and local deductible taxes.  Based on a 
cross-section of states, they found little evidence that own-source spending was affected 
by deductibility but did find that the mix of tax instruments was influenced by the 
deduction.  Subsequent work by Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1986), Metcalf (1993), and 
Gade and Adkins (1990) corroborated the findings of Feldstein and Metcalf using 
different time periods, and various combinations of state and local governments.
5   
  Figure 1 shows the state and local tax expenditure for non-business taxes 
excluding the property tax in real dollars (1982-84).  The tax expenditure drops off 
sharply after 1986 with the drop in marginal tax rates following TRA86.  It then has 
                                                 
4  Whether state and local government goods and services are public goods or provide positive externalities 
is a question I do not address in this paper. 
5   Feldstein and Metcalf's results suggested that states would shift away from their reliance on general sales 
taxes after 1986.  This appeared not to happen.  A number of papers addressed this issue including Inman 
(1989), Courant and Gramlich (1990),  Metcalf (1992), and Metcalf (1993).  More recent work by Izraeli 
and Kellman (2003) suggests that reliance on the general sales tax did eventually fall once sufficient time 
had passed.     5
increased steadily until the Bush tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003.  A similar pattern is 
observed for the tax expenditure for state and local property taxes (Figure 2).  Figure 3 
scales the tax expenditures for state and local taxes by state and local own-source 
revenue.  Again the pattern holds of a decline in the ratio after 1986 followed by a steady 
increase until this decade.  Figure 4 shows two key determinants of the level of tax 
expenditures.  It measures the ratio of state and local taxes to personal income and the 
national average marginal tax rate on wage income as computed by TAXSIM.  The sharp 
decline in marginal tax rates after TRA86 explains the sharp fall in tax expenditures in 
1987.  The gradual increase in the share of state and local taxes in personal income along 
with the rise in marginal tax rates contributes to the growth in tax expenditures.  This 
trend stops with the sharp fall in marginal tax rates beginning in 2001. 
III.  Measuring the Revenue Loss from State and Local Tax Deductibility 
  Before considering any behavioral responses that might arise from ending 
deductibility, I provide some statistics on measurements of the tax expenditure for 
deductibility where behavioral responses are ignored.  I first focus on errors that arise 
from adding tax expenditure estimates.  Both OMB and the Joint Committee on Taxation 
report tax expenditure estimates for state and local tax deductibility separately.  In 
general, users are cautioned not to add tax expenditure estimates given interactions within 
the tax code as deduction and other tax expenditure items are changed.  For example, one 
might expect that eliminating the deduction for all state and local personal taxes would 
yield a smaller tax expenditure estimate than the sum of the tax expenditures for personal 
non-property taxes and property taxes since removing one of the deduction will push 
some taxpayers below the threshold for itemizing deductions at which point their other 
state and local tax deduction becomes worthless.  On the other hand, removing one tax   6
deduction could push taxpayers into higher tax brackets thereby making the other 
deduction more valuable.  Thus whether summing individual tax expenditures over or 
underestimates the tax expenditure estimate from removing both deductions is a priori 
uncertain. 
  The first row of Table 1 shows results from using TAXSIM to estimate the state 
and local tax deduction tax expenditures for calendar year 2004 using the SOI public use 
file assuming elimination of the deduction under current law.  This is the difference in tax 
liability for an individual return (as calculated by TAXSIM) between the current law and 
the law assuming the elimination of the deduction.  This difference is computed at the 
individual level and then aggregated using the weight from the SOI dataset.  The sum of 
the individual estimates underestimates the aggregate measure by less than one-half of 
one percent.  This suggests that adding the two estimates does not seriously misrepresent 
the estimate of the tax expenditure from ending both deductions simultaneously.
6   Figure 
5 shows this error over time.  It peaks at 5 percent in 1993 and has been steadily falling 
since. 
  I also consider the errors in adding the tax expenditure estimates under different 
assumptions about the tax law.  In the second row of Table 1, I assume that no AMT 
patch is applied in 2004.  Now adding the estimates underestimates the aggregate tax 
expenditure estimate by 8 percent.  The error is smaller if the AMT is eliminated 
altogether or the Bush tax cuts not in effect.  In either case the error is less than 5 percent.  
In short, it does not appear that large errors occur when adding tax expenditure estimates 
                                                 
6  At the taxpayer level, adding expenditure estimates overestimates the tax expenditure by at least $580 for 
one percent of returns and underestimates the tax expenditure by at least $700 for one percent of returns.  
The error for ninety percent of taxpayers is $104 or less.  The error is less than one-half of one percent of 
cash income for over 98 percent of filers.   7
for the two state and local tax deduction tax expenditures to get an estimate of the tax 
expenditure arising from eliminating all state and local tax deductions altogether. 
  Next I provide estimates of tax expenditures for other changes to this deduction 
and consider the interaction between the federal tax treatment of state and local tax 
payments and the Bush tax cuts as well as the AMT.   In particular, I consider three other 
reforms.  The first replaces the deduction with a 15 percent non-refundable tax credit.  In 
effect this allows all taxpayers to deduct their state and local taxes as if they were in the 
15 percent tax bracket.
7  The second reform caps the deduction.  I consider two caps: one 
where all taxes are subject to a cap of $5,000 per year and a second where the cap is set 
equal to 3.5 percent of AGI.   The third reform allows a deduction above a floor.  If 
policymakers believe that the tax deduction has positive incentive effects, the floor 
lowers the cost of providing the deduction while continuing to provide an incentive for 
state and local spending.  Like the cap, I provide two types of floors: one set at $7,575 
and a second set at 4.4 percent of AGI.  The two caps and floors are constructed to 
generate a tax expenditure of $35 billion in 2004.  Results are shown in Table 2.   
  The first column of Table 2 shows the revenue cost under current law of taking 
intermediate actions rather than entirely eliminating the deduction for state and local 
taxes.  Replacing the deduction with a 15 percent tax credit raises considerably less than 
eliminating the deduction in part because taxpayers who were not receiving the benefit of 
the deduction due to their taking the standard deduction now have the opportunity to take 
                                                 
7  I calculate state income taxes for non-itemizers using the TAXSIM state tax calculator.  For property 
taxes, I hot deck from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.  I draw a similar taxpayer from the CEX (based 
on income category and number of dependents) and check to see if the taxpayer would itemize using the 
mortgage interest and property tax deduction imputed from the CEX (along with the calculated state 
income tax deduction).  If this return would itemize, I discard the CEX household and draw another similar 
household.  If this return would not itemize, I use this household's property tax payment for the SOI 
taxpayer.   8
the credit.  As noted above, the cap and floor reforms all have a tax expenditure of $35 
billion under current law.   
  Table 2 also shows the interaction between the deduction and other tax code 
provisions.  If there had been no AMT patch in 2004, the tax expenditure associated with 
eliminating deductibility would have been reduced by $10 billion, roughly 15 percent.  
The next column shows clearly how the AMT reduces the value of deductibility raising 
the tax expenditure by nearly $10 billion.  The AMT reduces the value of the state and 
local tax deduction considerably.  In the absence of an AMT patch, imposing the AMT 
reduces the value of the deduction by over one-quarter.  Finally, the Bush tax cuts also 
reduced the value of the deduction substantially with a reduction for 2004 of roughly 20 
percent.  Unlike the AMT, however, the value of the deduction is reduced not by 
disallowing the deduction but rather by lowering marginal tax rates.  A similar pattern 
holds for the alternatives to eliminating deductibility.   
IV. Distributional  Analysis 
  How are the benefits of deductibility distributed across taxpayer groups?  In this 
section, I report both income and geographic measures of the benefits of the deduction.  
For the income analysis, I use cash income to sort taxpayers.  Cash income equals 
adjusted gross income less state and local tax refunds plus adjustments to income, MSA 
and Keogh deductions, tax-exempt interest and non-taxable Social Security benefits.  The 
distributional impact is measured by taking weighted averages across the 150,000 returns 
in the 2004 Public Use File at different income deciles.
8   
                                                 
8   Cut-offs for the deciles in cash income are $5,440, $11,365, $17,340, $23,898, $31,960, $41,730, 
$53,710, $70,831, and $100,973.  The 95
th percentile cut-off is $140,381 and the 99
th percentile cut-off is 
$343,872.    9
  Table 3 presents the change in average tax liability for different income groups if 
deductibility were eliminated.  The increase in average tax liability is below $100 for the 
bottom 60 percent of the income distribution.  The tenth decile faces an average increase 
of $3,238.  Considerable skew occurs in this top decile as evidenced by the mean 
exceeding the increase in tax liability for the 75
th percentile.  Breaking down the top 
decile a bit further, the largest increases occur in the top one percent of the distribution.  
As a percentage of cash income, the increase in tax liability is quite small – less than one 
percent for the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution.  Eliminating this deduction 
does add progressivity to the tax system as the liability as a percentage of cash income 
rises monotonically with income.  The last column of Table 3 shows that the share of 
returns facing higher taxes goes up steadily with income.  
  A second reform possibility is to eliminate deductibility for a subset of state and 
local taxes.  Table 4 and 5 provide distributional impacts of these reforms.  More revenue 
is collected (ignoring behavioral responses) by eliminating the deduction for income and 
personal property taxes than property taxes.  Moreover, eliminating the income and 
personal property tax deductions adds more progressivity to the tax code than does 
eliminating the property tax deduction. 
  As an alternative to eliminating deductibility altogether, I consider three 
possibilities: replacing the deduction with a 15 percent tax credit; placing a cap on 
deductions; and allowing deductions above a floor.  Table 6 provides distributional 
results for shifting from the current deduction to the 15 percent credit.  This reform raises 
substantially less revenue than other reforms in part because households who take the 
standard deduction are allowed to take the credit.  Thus this reform lowers tax liability for 
some households though as Table 6 indicates the reductions are quite modest.  Fewer   10
taxpayers face higher tax bills than occurs if deductibility is eliminated altogether and the 
average change in tax liability is less than one-half of one percent of cash income.  
Compared to eliminating deductibility, this reform is less progressive. 
  Deductions can be capped in several ways.  I present results for a $5,000 cap and 
a cap set at 3.5 percent of AGI.  The tax expenditure estimate for both of these reforms is 
$35.0 billion in 2004.  Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the trade-offs in the two approaches.  The 
dollar based cap reform is more progressive than the AGI percentage cap reform.  
Capping the deduction as a percentage of AGI increases the tax liability more for the 
lower 90 percent of the income distribution than capping the deduction at $5,000.  The 
AGI based cap, however, leads to lower tax increases than does the dollar based cap for 
the top 5 percent of the income distribution.   
  Allowing a deduction above a floor is analyzed in Tables 9 and 10.   In contrast to 
the cap approach, the dollar based floor reform is less progressive than the AGI 
percentage based floor reform.  Comparing the dollar based cap and floor, the cap reform 
is more progressive than the floor reform. The dollar based floor approach preserves an 
incentive gain for state and local spending at the cost of some progressivity.  The AGI 
approach comparison is more mixed.  Except for the top 1 percent of the distribution, the 
floor reform is more progressive than the cap reform. 
  Table 11 presents some distributional information across states.  This table reports 
the average increase in tax liability by state from eliminating deductibility in dollar terms 
and as a percent of income.  The average increase per return in the U.S. is $473.  Several 
states have increases in excess of $700 (NJ, CT, MA, MD, DC, NY) while other states 
see average increases of less than $200 (TN, MS, SD, WV, WY).  On a percentage basis,   11
NJ, MD, CT, MA, DC, NY, and OR have increases of 0.6 percent of income or more 
while AR, LA, TN, MS, SD, WV have increases that are 0.1 percent of income. 
  Tables 12 through 17 consider how changes in the tax code affect the distribution 
of tax expenditures for various reform proposals.  In Table 12, I consider eliminating all 
deductions for state and local taxes assuming no AMT patch, no AMT, and no Bush tax 
cuts, all in 2004.  The pattern of increased taxes from eliminating the deduction is not 
surprising given the aggregate estimate of the tax expenditure in Table 1.  A few 
interesting facts emerge.  First, the AMT patch in 2004 increases the regressivity of the 
deduction with most of the impact occurring in the top decile.  This point is reinforced by 
a comparison of the Current distribution with the No AMT distribution.  In the absence of 
the AMT the state and local tax deduction is more regressive, again with nearly all the 
increased regressivity occurring in the top 5 percent of the income distribution.  Second, 
the Bush tax cuts also served to reduce the regressivity of this deduction.  Unlike in the 
AMT case, the change in tax burden is spread over more deciles.  Similar patterns occur 
for the other potential reforms of the deduction.    
  These distributional results hold behavior constant.  I next turn to a 
reconsideration of the behavioral impacts of ending deductibility of state and local taxes.  
While the results from this analysis can't be used to compute new distributional tables, 
they are informative about the revenue impact of ending or otherwise modifying 
deductibility. 
V.  Empirical Analysis of Behavioral Response to the Deduction 
  State and local governments choose their mix of revenue instruments as well as 
the level of spending knowing that taxpayers in their state may be able to deduct some of 
these taxes on their federal return.  This exporting of state and local taxes to the federal   12
government lowers the political cost of raising revenue at the sub-federal level.  How do 
state and local governments respond to this feature of the federal tax code?  I measure 
this response by following the empirical strategy of Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) and 
estimating regressions of state and local deductible taxes, non-deductible taxes, and own-
source revenue where I control for the impact of federal deductibility.  In contrast to this 
previous analysis, I employ panel data from 1979 through 2001, excluding 2000.
9   
Where calendar year data are matched with fiscal year data, the calendar year data for the 
beginning of the fiscal year are used.  Thus for state and local data for FY 1998, calendar 
year data from 1997 are used.  This reflects the fact that decisions about fiscal structure 
are set at the beginning of the fiscal year which occurs in the previous calendar year. 
  The key tax variable is the tax price for state and local tax deductions.  This is the 
reduction in federal and state taxes arising from an additional dollar of tax deduction.  As 
a simple example of the concept, consider a taxpayer whose federal tax bracket is 25 
percent.  Further assume that federal taxes are not deductible at the state level.  In that 
case, an additional $100 of state tax deductions will reduce federal tax liability by $25.  
The net cost of raising this $100 of state taxes is only $75 as $25 has been exported to the 
federal government through deductibility.  If mi is the i
th taxpayer's federal marginal tax 
bracket, then this taxpayer's  tax price (Pi) for state and local deductible taxes is 
(1)  Pi = 1 – mi. 
This assumes that the taxpayer itemizes her deductions.  The tax price for a non-itemizer 
is one.  Let di be a dummy variable equally one for an itemizer and zero for a non-
itemizer.  Then this taxpayer's tax price is 
                                                 
9  State and local fiscal data are from the Bureau of the Census, Federal, State, and Local Governments 
webpage at http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.html.  Data were accessed in July, 2007.  State 
level data are not available for FY 2000.   13
(2)  Pi = di(1-mi) + (1-di) = 1 – dimi. 
If federal taxes can be deducted at the state level, then the formula for the tax price is 
slightly more complicated: 






















While this is a formidable looking equation, the NBER's TAXSIM calculator can 
compute these tax prices easily.  TAXSIM is a computer tax model of the federal and 
state tax codes covering federal and state tax codes from 1977 to 2006.
10   
  I estimate regressions of the following form: 
(4)  it t i it it it X P Y ε γ α β β + + + + = 2 1   
where i indexes states and t indexes years.  The dependent variable is some function of 
deductible state and local taxes, non-deductible state and local taxes and fees, or own 
source revenue.  I will report regressions where the dependent variable is the fiscal 
variable relative to personal income or the log of the fiscal variable.  In the latter case, the 
log of income is included as a regressor.  The 1 by k vector, Xit, contains variables that 
help explain the dependent variable.  These must vary within states over time given the 
inclusion of state-specific fixed effects and year dummies.  State-specific fixed effects are 
included to control for unobserved attributes of a state that affect fiscal structure and are 
likely correlated with explanatory variables.
11  Year dummies provide a flexible 
framework for controlling for aggregate shocks to state and local tax systems and 
spending. 
                                                 
10   See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for a description of TAXSIM.  Equation (3) is not exactly correct as it 
does not account for the phase out of itemized deductions that began in 2000 or the Alternative Minimum 
Tax.  TAXSIM takes these provisions of the tax code into account when computing tax prices. 
11 See Holtz-Eakin (1986) for a discussion of biases arising from not controlling for fixed effects in state 
and local government fiscal structure regressions.   14
  As pointed out by Feldstein and Metcalf (1987), OLS regressions run on equation 
(4) are likely to provide biased estimates of the coefficient on the tax price variable.  This 
is most easily seen by considering equation (2). Consider a shock that increases state 
income tax collections.  This increases the deduction available to the tax payer with two 
opposing effects.  The first effect is that an increase in the potential state tax deduction 
increases the likelihood that a taxpayer will itemize on her federal tax return.  This 
induces a negative correlation between the error term ( it ε ) and the tax price Pit and biases 
the OLS estimate of  1 β  down.  The second effect is that an increase in deductions could 
push the tax payer into a lower tax bracket lowering mit.  This induces a positive 
correlation between the error term and the tax price and biases the OLS estimate of  1 β   
up.  Which effect dominates is an empirical question. 
  To control for endogeneity, I construct three instruments.  The first is a synthetic 
instrument that attributes to each household the national probability of itemizing based on 
number of dependents (0, 1, 2+)  and AGI group.  I divide households into one of eight 
equally sized AGI groups.
12  The instrument for taxpayer i in year t  is 
(5)  ) , ( ) , ( ˆ k j d k AGI Class j Dep d
N
t it it it = = =  
where d
N
t(j, k) is the probability of itemizing in the national sample in year t for 
households with j dependents in AGI class k.   
  The second instrument is constructed by setting the i
th taxpayer's state and local 
tax deductions to zero and computing the change in tax liability resulting from a marginal 
increase in wage income.  Call this marginal tax rate 
0
it m .  The instrument is called a first 
dollar tax price and equals 
                                                 
12   The cut points for the AGI groups vary across years to maintain equally sized groups.   15
(6) 
0 0 ˆ 1 it it it m d P − = . 
  The third instrument is constructed by replacing the taxpayer's state and local tax 
deductions with national averages based on number of dependents and AGI class and 
then computing the change in tax liability resulting from a marginal increase in wage 
income.  Call this marginal tax rate 
L





it m d P ˆ 1− = . 
  Table 18 shows summary statistics for the variables I use in the regressions.  
Deductible taxes average 5.8 percent of personal income, ranging from 1.9 to 11.8 
percent.  Nondeductible taxes and fees average 8.9 percent of personal income and show 
a wider range across states and time.  Own source revenue is the sum of these two 
variables averaging 14.7 percent of personal income.  In addition to the tax price variable, 
I include demographic data on percentage young (age 17 and under) and old (age 65 and 
older).  These two demographic groups are important drivers of demands for state and 
local public services, especially at the local level.
13  The change in the unemployment 
rate is included to control for state-specific economic shocks not captured by state or year 
effects.  The next set of variables captures features of the distribution of income in the 
state that could affect the demand for revenue as well as the tax mix.  They also control 
for non-linear income effects that the tax price variable might otherwise be proxying for.  
Finally, I include information about the share of households married in the state.   
  Table 19 presents regression results for personal deductible taxes.  Column (1) 
presents an OLS regression of non-business deductible taxes on the tax price variable and 
other control variables.  Before discussing the tax price coefficient, let me discuss some 
                                                 
13 It is possible that state tax structure can affect the age distribution of populations living in a state.  This is 
an interesting issue that I do not pursue in this paper.  I thank Roger Gordon for pointing this out.  Tax 
price results are insensitive to excluding these variables.    16
of the other variables.  The coefficient on the AGI range variables are positive with the 
coefficient on fr25 and fr100 statistically significant.  As might be expected the 
coefficient on fr100 is substantially larger than the coefficient on fr25 or fr50.  This 
pattern holds in general for the other regressions on non-business deductible taxes.  The 
AGI variance and skew variables never come in statistically significant in these 
regressions indicating that once controlling for shares of AGI in various income groups, 
other distribution statistics do not affect the choice of these taxes.  The form of income 
also has little impact on the level of this tax.  The coefficient on capagi is statistically 
significant in all regressions though the estimated elasticity (not reported) is quite small. 
  States with a large share of young children or elderly people tend to have lower 
reliance on personal deductible taxes though only the coefficient on the share of young 
children is statistically significant.  The coefficient on the elderly share likely reflects a 
demand for lower overall spending by the elderly.  The coefficient on the child share is a 
bit puzzling since this should correlate with a demand for school spending.  Contrary to 
the finding in Metcalf (1993), increases in the unemployment rate are associated with a 
greater reliance on personal deductible taxes. 
  The coefficient on the tax price variable equals -2.57 and is highly statistically 
significant.  The elasticity at the mean equals -4.1 suggesting that tax structure is highly 
responsive to changes in the tax price.  We must be cautious about this estimate given the 
potential endogeneity discussed above.  The next regression in Table 19 presents two 
stage least squares estimates of the coefficients controlling for the endogeneity in the tax 
price variable with the instruments described above.  The first stage regression (not 
reported here) has a high R
2 with an F statistic on the joint significance of the instruments 
highly significant.  In the second stage regression (column (2)) the coefficient estimate on   17
the tax price variable increases in absolute value from -2.57 to -2.72.  The upward bias in 
the OLS estimate suggests that the tax bracket bias outweighs the itemization bias.  While 
the coefficient is less precisely estimated, it is still statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level.  The elasticity at the mean of the reliance on deductible taxes with respect to the tax 
price is -4.3.   
  The next regression excludes other explanatory variables except for the AGI share 
variables, the change in unemployment rate and the population demographic variables.  
The two stage least squares estimate rises slightly from -2.72 to -2.84 and continues to be 
highly statistically significant.
14  The tax price elasticity at the mean from this regression 
equals -4.5.   As in all other two-stage least squares regressions that I run, the first stage 
regressions fit quite well and provide no evidence of problems arising from weak 
instruments. 
  I also report regressions for a log specification where the dependent variable is the 
ln of deductible taxes.  In addition to the AGI share variables, I include the log of income 
in the regression.  The tax price coefficient in the two-stage least squares regressions 
continues to have the expected sign but is not statistically significant in the full regressors 
specification and only significant at the 10 percent level in the restricted specification  
and the elasticity of revenues with respect to the tax price is lower than the elasticity 
implied by the levels regressions.   
  The pattern of results from the levels and log regressions are quite similar to the 
those of Feldstein and Metcalf (1987).  The levels regressions tend to suggest higher 
                                                 
14   Which variables I choose to exclude has little impact on the coefficient estimates.  If I drop all variables 
except the year dummies, the estimated tax price coefficient equals -4.70 with a standard error of 0.52.  If I 
drop all other variables including the year dummies, the estimated tax price coefficient rises to -5.90 with a 
standard error of 0.20.  Excluding year effects likely biases the coefficient estimate down.  Adverse 
aggregate shocks reduce state income tax revenue and are likely to push taxpayers into lower tax brackets 
thereby raising their tax price.     18
elasticities at the means and have a higher level of statistical significance than the 
coefficients arising from the log regressions.
15   
  If changes in the tax mix occur in response to changes in the deductibility of state 
and local taxes, then we should see an increase in the use of non-deductible taxes and 
fees in response to an increase in the tax price for state and local taxes.  I explore this in 
Table 20.  The format of the table is the same as Table 19.  Column (1) presents results 
from an OLS regression using the full set of explanatory variables.  The coefficient on the 
tax price variable is positive as would be expected if tax shifting from deductible taxes to 
non-deductible taxes and fees were occurring but the coefficient estimate is not 
statistically significant.  The AGI share variables suggest that states with a large share of 
tax filers with AGI of at least $100,000 rely less on non-deductible taxes and fees, a 
result consistent with the results in Table 19 and quite plausible given the higher value of 
the deduction to high tax-bracket filers.   
  Once I instrument for the tax price variable (column (2)), the coefficient on this 
variable increases to 2.34 and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  As in the 
OLS regression, states with a high share of high income households tend to prefer 
deductible to non-deductible taxes with the coefficient on fr100 substantially larger in 
this regression.  The elasticity at the mean for the tax price variable is 2.46 confirming the 
finding from the Table 19 regressions that tax swapping is quite sensitive to changes in 
the tax price for state and local tax deductions.  Using the restricted set of regressors, the 
coefficient estimate rises to 3.04 and continues to be highly statistically significant.  Now 
the elasticity at the mean is 3.2.  The log regressions also confirm the tax shifting result 
                                                 
15   One might be concerned that my AGI distribution variables do not entirely control for income effects 
and that the tax price variable continues to pick up some income effects.  Income is explicitly included in 
the log regressions.  I experimented with adding AGI to the ratio regressions and the results are not 
affected.   19
though the two-stage least squares estimate with the full set of regressors is only 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  For the regression with restricted set of 
regressors, the p-value of the coefficient estimate is .04.   
  Tables 19 and 20 have focused on how state and local governments choose their 
mix of taxes and fees.  I now turn to the impact of deductibility on own source revenue.  
The first column of Table 21 reports an OLS regression of the ratio of own source 
revenue to personal income on the full set of regressors.  By this regression, the 
deduction leads to a substantial increase in reliance on own source revenue by state and 
local governments.  However, the result goes away once I instrument for the tax price 
variable (column (2)).  The estimated coefficient on the tax price variable is -0.38 but not 
statistically significant.  Of the other variables, the demographic variables have the most 
substantial impact.  States with a higher share of elderly, in particular, have substantially 
lower levels of own source revenue.  The elasticity at the means for this regressor equals 
-0.55 and is the largest elasticity among all the regressors in this specification.   
  Results are robust to the specification form.  Restricting the regressors in the 
levels regression changes the point estimate on the tax price variable to 0.20 but it is still 
not statistically significant.  The regression estimate is negative in both log specifications 
but again neither large nor statistically significant. 
  Summarizing, deductibility appears to have little impact on the overall level of 
own source revenue at the state and local level.  But it does appear to have an effect on 
the mix of revenues with a greater reliance on the income and personal property tax and 
lesser reliance on non-deductible taxes and fees.   
  The Treasury tax expenditure estimate for state and local tax deductibility equaled 
$65 billion in fiscal year 2004.  Let's consider the implications of the regression estimates   20
for eliminating deductibility in that year.  The average marginal tax price for deductible 
taxes in calendar year 2003 was 94.3.  Consider the regression estimates from the ratio 
regression with restricted number of regressors.  This implies that removing deductibility 
will reduce deductible taxes per thousand dollars of personal income by 2.8 times the 
change in tax price.  Nondeductible taxes and charges per thousand dollars of personal 
income are predicted to rise by 3.0 times the change in tax price.  Finally own-source 
revenue per $1000 of personal income is predicted to rise by 0.2 times the change in tax 
price.  Personal income in calendar year 2003 was $9.15 trillion.  The regression 
estimates imply that removing deductibility leads to a reduction in deductible taxes of 
$146 billion.  Non-deductible taxes and fees increase by $156 billion and own-source 
revenue rises by $10 billion.   
  The increase in non-deductible taxes and fees more than offsets the decline in 
deductible taxes.  If these non-deductible taxes and fees were entirely paid by corporate 
businesses, then corporate income tax collections would fall by $55 billion, 84 percent of 
the value of the tax expenditure arising from removing deductibility.  This assumes a 35 
percent rate applied to these increased taxes and fees.  The calculation does not factor in 
any lost tax revenues from reductions in dividends paid or capital gains.  It also does not 
allow for the possibility that some of the cost is shifted to workers in the form of lower 
wages or consumers in the form of higher prices.  In the former case, the relevant tax rate 
would be that on wage earnings while if the latter, no revenue loss occurs.
16   
                                                 
16   I also computed revenue losses from the restricted log regressions (last columns of Tables 19-21).  The 
impacts on deductible taxes, non-deductible taxes and fees, and own-source revenue from ending 
deductibility are not internally consistent across the three regressions since the log of own-source revenue 
is not equal to the sum of the logs of the two revenue sources.  If I assume that the impact on own-source 
revenue is zero (the own-source regression predicts a $6 billion fall, a decline of less than one-half of one 
percent), I can estimate the revenue impact either from the regression in Table 19 or Table 20.  Using the 
estimate from the deductible tax regression, the offset from corporate tax collections  (assuming businesses 
pay the entire increase in non-deductible taxes and fees) is $30 billion, just under half the reported tax   21
  In reality not all of the non-deductible taxes are paid by corporations.  It can not 
be determined from an inspection of the components of these taxes and fees what the 
burden would be on corporate taxable income from a removal of deductibility.  Current 
collections reflect the average burden.  What determines the revenue loss is the marginal 
change in tax instruments arising from an end to deductibility.  But regardless, it appears 
that the tax expenditure estimate that ignores the behavioral response at the state and 
local level leads to quite possibly a substantial overestimate of the revenue benefits of 
eliminating deductibility. 
VI. Conclusion 
  The deduction for state and local taxes has been in the income tax since its 
modern inception.  It is justified by some proponents as an important subsidy for state 
and local spending on the grounds that it increases spending on public goods that would 
otherwise be underfunded.  While I do not assess the argument that state and local 
government spending is on public goods and therefore likely to be underfunded, the 
empirical evidence is that the tax deduction does not lead to increased state and local 
spending.  In fact the empirical evidence is mixed with some estimates suggesting more 
spending and others less.  None of the IV estimates, however, are statistically significant. 
  The evidence is compelling, however, that deductibility affects the mix of revenue 
instruments chosen at the state and local level.  Deductibility leads to a greater reliance 
on income and property taxes and a lower reliance on non-deductible taxes and fees.  
Because these non-deductible taxes and fees are a cost for businesses, some of the 
revenue that would arise from eliminating this deduction would be lost through declines 
                                                                                                                                                 
expenditure loss from ending deductibility.  If I use the estimate from the regression in Table 20, the offset 
is $107 billion, roughly two-thirds larger than the estimated tax expenditure.   22
in corporate and business tax income.  The revenue loss offset to the measured tax 
expenditure could be quite substantial. 
 Distributional  analysis  suggests that the tax deduction is quite regressive.  
Moreover the value of the subsidy varies considerably across states.  Alternatives to 
eliminating this deduction that I considered include capping the deduction, setting a floor 
on the deduction, and replacing it with a 15 percent tax credit.  The cap and floor reforms 
are intermediate options that raise about one-half the revenue that is raised by eliminating 
the deduction (ignoring behavioral offsets).  Replacing the deduction with a 15 percent 
tax credit raises the least amount of revenue before behavioral responses since some 
people are now eligible for the credit who take the standard deduction and so do not 
benefit from the deduction.  In terms of adding progressivity to the tax code, the tax 
credit has at best a modest impact in large part due to the smaller amount of revenue 
raised under this reform.  Capping the deduction as a percentage of AGI is less 
progressive than capping it with a dollar based cap.  In contrast, the AGI percentage 
based floor reform is more progressive than a dollar based floor reform. 
  This paper has shown that the tax system can be made more progressive if the 
deduction for state and local taxes is eliminated or curtailed.  The regression results also 
suggest that the deduction is ineffective at increasing own source spending at the sub-
federal level.  It may be that the deduction encourages a shift in spending from certain 
programs to other areas.  This remains an interesting topic for future research.    23
 











Current Law  40,330  22,014  62,549  -0.3%
No AMT Patch  32,063  16,391  52,587  -7.9%
No AMT  48,617  26,602  71,987  4.5%
No Bush Tax Cuts  52,024  28,293  78,860  1.8%





Table 2.  Effects of Tax Law Changes on Tax Expenditure Estimates 
Proposal  Current 
Law 
No AMT 
Patch  No AMT  No Bush 
Tax Cuts 
Eliminate Deductibility  62,546  52,585  71,985  78,859 
15% Tax Credit  14,062  4,093  23,553  30,128 
$5,000 Cap on Deduction  35,063  25,628  44,071  45,537 
3.5% AGI Cap on Deduction  35,025  26,234  43,263  45,589 
$7,575 Floor on Deduction  34,897  28,208  39,230  44,135 
4.4% AGI Floor on Deduction  34,909  27,745  41,406  44,925 
Source: NBER TAXSIM Model applied to SOI Public Use Data for 2004.  All amounts are in millions of 
dollars. 
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Table 3.  Distributional Impact of Eliminating Deductibility: 








Returns with Increase 
in Tax Liability 
1  0 0 0 0.0%  0% 
2  1 0 0 0.0%  1% 
3  6 0 0 0.0%  4% 
4 15  0  0  0.1%  8% 
5 40  0  0  0.1%  16% 
6  100 0 100 0.3%  28% 
7  215 0 342 0.5%  40% 
8  371 0 627 0.6%  54% 
9 746  0  1,196  0.9%  70% 
10  3,238 840 3,191  1.3%  86% 
90-95% 1,536 609 2,289  1.3%  85% 
95-99%  2,639 1,209 3,814  1.4%  89% 
top  1%  14,139 1,915 13,254  1.4%  84% 




Table 4.  Distributional Impact of Eliminating Deductibility: 








Returns with Increase 
in Tax Liability 
1  0 0 0 0.0%  0% 
2  0 0 0 0.0%  0% 
3  1 0 0 0.0%  1% 
4  5 0 0 0.0%  4% 
5 16  0  0  0.1%  11% 
6 47  0  0  0.1%  21% 
7  109 0 149 0.2%  30% 
8  197 0 351 0.3%  42% 
9  432 0 729 0.5%  58% 
10  2,244 0 1,961 0.8%  70% 
90-95% 903  0  1,471 0.8%  70% 
95-99%  1,531 0 2,433 0.8%  70% 
top  1%  11,794 0 10,577 1.0%  69% 
Source: NBER TAXSIM Model applied to SOI Public Use Data for 2004.     25
 
Table 5.  Distributional Impact of Eliminating Deductibility: 








Returns with Increase 
in Tax Liability 
1  0 0 0 0.0%  0% 
2  1 0 0 0.0%  1% 
3  5 0 0 0.0%  3% 
4 11  0  0  0.1%  6% 
5 26  0  0  0.1%  13% 
6 59  0  0  0.2%  24% 
7  117 0 166 0.2%  36% 
8  197 0 313 0.3%  49% 
9  360 0 549 0.4%  66% 
10 890  0  1,200  0.5%  74% 
90-95% 700 193  1,031 0.6%  80% 
95-99% 836  0  1,305 0.5%  71% 
top  1%  2,056 0 2,783 0.3%  58% 




Table 6.  Distributional Impact of Replacing Deduction 








Returns with Increase 
in Tax Liability 
1  0 0 0 0.0%  0% 
2 -1  0  0  0.0%  0% 
3 -2  0  0  0.0%  0% 
4 -6  0  0  0.0%  0% 
5 -12  0  0  0.0%  0% 
6 -20  0  0  -0.1%  2% 
7  0 0 0 0.0%  13% 
8  3 0 0 0.0%  16% 
9 93  0  276  0.1%  36% 
10  1,009 0 1,189 0.4%  71% 
90-95%  448 0 881 0.4%  70% 
95-99% 686  0  1,507 0.4%  73% 
top 1%  5,104  -114  6,198  0.4%  66% 
Source: NBER TAXSIM Model applied to SOI Public Use Data for 2004.   
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Returns with Increase 
in Tax Liability 
1  0 0 0 0.0%  0% 
2  0 0 0 0.0%  0% 
3  0 0 0 0.0%  0% 
4  1 0 0 0.0%  0% 
5  2 0 0 0.0%  1% 
6  6 0 0 0.0%  3% 
7 19  0  0  0.0%  7% 
8 61  0  0  0.1%  19% 
9  230 0 314 0.3%  45% 
10  2,332 0 1,989 0.8%  74% 
90-95% 729  0  1,167 0.6%  70% 
95-99% 1,625 116 2,552  0.8%  77% 
top  1% 13,180 783 12,041  1.2%  80% 




Table 8.  Distributional Impact of Capping Deduction  








Returns with Increase 
in Tax Liability 
1 0  0 0 0.0%  0% 
2 1  0 0 0.0%  1% 
3 4  0 0 0.0%  3% 
4 10  0 0 0.0%  6% 
5 25  0 0 0.1%  13% 
6 61  0 0 0.2%  25% 
7 128  0 155 0.3%  35% 
8 220  0 347 0.4%  47% 
9 434  0 700 0.5%  62% 
10 1,767  0 1,780 0.7%  72% 
90-95% 883  0 1,369 0.7%  75% 
95-99% 1,288  0 2,103 0.7%  72% 
top 1%  8,107  0 6,821 0.7%  62% 
Source: NBER TAXSIM Model applied to SOI Public Use Data for 2004.   
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Table 9.  Distributional Impact of Setting a Floor  








Returns with Increase 
in Tax Liability 
1 0  0 0 0.0%  0% 
2 1  0 0 0.0%  1% 
3 5  0 0 0.0%  4% 
4 14  0 0 0.1%  8% 
5 39  0 0 0.1%  16% 
6 98  0 100 0.3%  28% 
7 209  0 340 0.4%  40% 
8 356  0 627 0.6%  54% 
9 680  0 1,136 0.8%  70% 
10 1,235  301 1,894 0.8%  79% 
90-95% 1,221  561 1,894 1.0%  84% 
95-99% 1,241  142 2,092 0.7%  77% 
top 1%  1,286  0 2,651 0.2%  59% 




Table 10.  Distributional Impact of Setting a Floor  








Returns with Increase 
in Tax Liability 
1 0  0 0 0.0%  0% 
2 0  0 0 0.0%  1% 
3 2  0 0 0.0%  3% 
4 7  0 0 0.0%  7% 
5 20  0 0 0.1%  15% 
6 56  0 81 0.1%  28% 
7 123  0 275 0.3%  40% 
8 219  0 408 0.4%  54% 
9 452  0 800 0.5%  70% 
10 1,762  432 1,599 0.7%  81% 
90-95% 911  501 1,308 0.8%  83% 
95-99% 1,355  406 1,983 0.7%  80% 
top 1%  7,644  0 8,216 0.7%  73% 







Table 11.  Distributional Impact of Eliminating Deductibility: 
Average Across State Taxpayers 









AK 261  0.2 MT  266  0.2 
AL 265  0.2 NC  465  0.4 
AR 212  0.1 ND  218  0.2 
AZ 334  0.3 NE  362  0.3 
CA 639  0.5 NH  566  0.5 
CO 531  0.4 NJ  888  0.7 
CT 869  0.6 NM  330  0.2 
DC 748  0.6 NV  262  0.2 
DE 340  0.3 NY  721  0.6 
FL 300  0.2 OH  461  0.5 
GA 463  0.4 OK  296  0.3 
HI 444  0.4 OR  558  0.6 
IA 377  0.4 PA  449  0.4 
ID 337  0.3 RI  572  0.5 
IL 527  0.4 SC  310  0.3 
IN 346  0.3 SD  171  0.1 
KS 404  0.3 TN  177  0.1 
KY 376  0.4 TX  317  0.2 
LA 212  0.1 UT  396  0.4 
MA 776  0.6 VA  634  0.5 
MD 775  0.7 VT  379  0.4 
ME 323  0.3 WA  272  0.2 
MI 440  0.4 WI  372  0.5 
MN 521  0.4 WV  115  0.1 
MO 363  0.3 WY  44  0.1 
MS 173  0.1 U.S.  473  0.4 
Source: NBER TAXSIM Model applied to SOI Public Use Data for 2004.  
State distributions don't allocate high income returns perfectly to states 
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Table 12. Impact of Tax Code Changes on Tax Expenditure: 
Elimination of Deductibility 


















1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
2 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
3 6 0.0% 6 0.0% 6 0.0% 8 0.1% 
4 15 0.1% 15 0.1% 15 0.1% 19 0.1% 
5 40 0.1% 40 0.1% 40 0.1% 49 0.2% 
6 100 0.3% 100 0.3% 101 0.3% 115 0.3% 
7 215 0.4% 211 0.4% 215 0.4% 243 0.5% 
8 371 0.6% 365 0.6% 373 0.6% 427 0.7% 
9 746 0.9% 729 0.9% 757 0.9% 971 1.1% 
10 3,238 1.3% 2,512 0.9% 3,936 1.5% 4,131 1.7% 
90-95%  1,536 1.3% 1,112 0.9% 1,593 1.3% 1,793 1.5% 
95-99%  2,639 1.4% 1,451 0.8% 3,454 1.7% 3,463 1.7% 
top  1%  14,139 1.4% 13,754 1.3% 17,583 1.9% 18,497 2.0% 
Source: NBER TAXSIM Model applied to SOI Public Use Data for 2004.   
 
Table 13. Impact of Tax Code Changes on Tax Expenditure: 
Replace Deduction with 15% Credit 


















1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
2 -1 0.0% -1 0.0% 0 0.0% -1 0.0% 
3 -2 0.0% -2 0.0% -2 0.0% -1 0.0% 
4 -6 0.0% -6 0.0% -6 0.0% -4 0.0% 
5 -12 0.0% -12 0.0% -12 0.0%  -7  0.0% 
6  -20 -0.1% -20 -0.1% -19 -0.1% -10 0.0% 
7 0 0.0% -3 0.0% 0 0.0%  25  0.1% 
8 3 0.0% -3 0.0% 5 0.0%  58  0.1% 
9  93  0.1%  76  0.1% 105 0.1% 317 0.4% 
10 1,009 0.4%  283  0.0% 1,710 0.6% 1,902 0.7% 
90-95%  448 0.4%  24  0.0% 505 0.4% 704 0.6% 
95-99%  686  0.4%  -503 -0.2% 1,504 0.7% 1,508 0.7% 
top  1%  5,104 0.4% 4,719 0.3% 8,561 1.0% 9,461 1.0% 
Source: NBER TAXSIM Model applied to SOI Public Use Data for 2004.   30
 
Table 14. Impact of Tax Code Changes on Tax Expenditure: 
Cap Deduction at $5,000 


















1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
2 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
3 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
4 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
5 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 3 0.0% 
6 6 0.0% 6 0.0% 7 0.0% 7 0.0% 
7 19 0.0% 18 0.0% 19 0.0% 21 0.0% 
8 61 0.1% 57 0.1% 62 0.1% 66 0.1% 
9 230 0.3% 172 0.2% 237 0.3% 275 0.3% 
10 2,332 0.8% 1,683 0.4% 3,005 1.0% 3,071 1.0% 
90-95%  729 0.6% 366 0.3% 773 0.6% 824 0.7% 
95-99%  1,625 0.8%  547  0.3% 2,407 1.2% 2,309 1.1% 
top  1%  13,180 1.2% 12,807 1.1% 16,554 1.7% 17,355 1.8% 
Source: NBER TAXSIM Model applied to SOI Public Use Data for 2004.   
 
Table 15. Impact of Tax Code Changes on Tax Expenditure: 
Cap Deduction at 3.5% of AGI 


















1  0  0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
2  1  0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
3  4  0.0% 4 0.0% 4 0.0% 5 0.0% 
4  10  0.0% 10 0.0% 10 0.0% 13 0.1% 
5  25  0.1% 25 0.1% 25 0.1% 31 0.1% 
6  61  0.2% 61 0.2% 62 0.2% 69 0.2% 
7  128  0.3% 125 0.3% 128 0.3% 142 0.3% 
8  220  0.4% 213 0.3% 221 0.4% 247 0.4% 
9  434  0.5% 376 0.4% 443 0.5% 544 0.6% 
10  1,767 0.7% 1,170 0.4% 2,378 0.9% 2,396 0.9% 
90-95%  883  0.7% 487 0.4% 930 0.8%  1,004  0.9% 
95-99%  1,288 0.7%  360  0.2% 2,031 1.0% 1,909 1.0% 
top  1%  8,107 0.7%  7,822  0.6% 11,010 1.2% 11,301 1.2% 
Source: NBER TAXSIM Model applied to SOI Public Use Data for 2004.     31
 
Table 16. Impact of Tax Code Changes on Tax Expenditure: 
$7,575 Floor on Deduction 


















1  0  0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
2  1  0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
3  5  0.0% 5 0.0% 5 0.0% 8 0.1% 
4  14  0.1% 14 0.1% 14 0.1% 19 0.1% 
5  39  0.1% 39 0.1% 39 0.1% 48 0.2% 
6  98  0.3% 98 0.3% 99 0.3%  113  0.3% 
7  209  0.4% 206 0.4% 209 0.4% 236 0.5% 
8  356  0.6% 351 0.6% 358 0.6% 411 0.7% 
9  680  0.8% 663 0.8% 691 0.8% 891 1.0% 
10  1,235 0.8%  757  0.5% 1,550 0.9% 1,612 1.0% 
90-95%  1,221 1.0%  842  0.7% 1,270 1.1% 1,422 1.2% 
95-99%  1,241 0.7%  543  0.3% 1,748 0.9% 1,706 0.9% 
top  1%  1,286 0.2% 1,188 0.2% 2,161 0.4% 2,181 0.4% 
Source: NBER TAXSIM Model applied to SOI Public Use Data for 2004.   
 
Table 17. Impact of Tax Code Changes on Tax Expenditure: 
4.4% of AGI Floor on Deduction 


















1  0  0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
2  0  0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
3  2  0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 3 0.0% 
4  7  0.0% 7 0.0% 7 0.0% 8 0.0% 
5  20  0.1% 20 0.1% 20 0.1% 24 0.1% 
6  56  0.1% 55 0.1% 56 0.1% 62 0.2% 
7  123  0.3% 121 0.3% 123 0.3% 137 0.3% 
8  219  0.4% 213 0.3% 220 0.4% 250 0.4% 
9  452  0.5% 418 0.5% 459 0.5% 586 0.7% 
10  1,762 0.7% 1,262 0.4% 2,244 0.9% 2,326 0.9% 
90-95%  911  0.8% 581 0.5% 954 0.8%  1,053  0.9% 
95-99%  1,355 0.7%  573  0.3% 1,952 1.0% 1,906 1.0% 
top  1%  7,644 0.7% 7,425 0.6% 9,864 1.1%  10,374 1.1% 
Source: NBER TAXSIM Model applied to SOI Public Use Data for 2004.     32
 
Table 18.  Summary Statistics 
Var Description Mean  St.Dev.  Min  Max 
ded  Deductible Taxes (per $1000 of personal 
income)  58.6 16.9 19.2 117.6
nded  Non-Deductible Taxes and Charges (per $1000 
of personal income)  88.8 25.9 44.0 204.5
own  Own Source Revenue (per $1000 of personal 
income)  147.4 23.0 95.5 322.1
rate  Tax Price for Deductible Taxes  93.1 2.0  85.9 98.4
frate  First Dollar Tax Price Instrument  79.1 2.6  70.5 86.8
zrate  Last Dollar Tax Price Instrument  79.6 2.6  71.1 87.2
phat  Synthetic Probability of Itemizing  30.9 4.8  18.0 43.6
pchild  Share of Population between ages 0 and 17  26.5 2.4  19.9 37.5
pold  Share of Population age 65 and older  12.9 2.2  7.5 20.5
cru  Change in the Unemployment Rate  0.0 1.0  -4.2 4.2
fr25  Share of returns with AGI between $25K and 
$50K  24.2 3.9 8.9 37.5
fr50  Share of returns with AGI between $50K and 
$100K  11.8 6.9 1.1 32.3
fr100  Share of returns with AGI over $100K  3.2 2.9  0.0 17.2
agi2  Variance of AGI in State  31,940.4 80,717.7  157.7 1,872,309.0
agi3  Skew of AGI in State  3,709.6 37,099.0  -119,724.4 1,009,043.0
divagi  Mean of Dividends to AGI  7.4 2.9  2.9 21.6
capagi  Mean of Capital Gains to AGI  4.6 3.3  -13.5 44.6
pmar  Percentage of filing units that are married  46.1 5.3  34.4 65.2
Source: State and local tax data from Census of Governments, State and Local Government Finances; tax return data from SOI 
Public Use Files and TAXSIM; demographic data from U.S. Census Bureau, Census and Population Estimates; unemployment 
data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics.  Data for 48 continental states between fiscal 
years 1979 through 2001, excluding 2000. 
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Table 19.  Deductible Tax Regressions 
   Ratio Specification  Logarithmic Specification 
 All  Restricted  All  Restricted 
   OLS IV  IV  IV  IV 












































AGI Variance  0.00001 
(0.000007) 
0.00001 
(0.000007)    0.0000002 
(0.0000001)   
AGI Skew  -0.00002 
(0.00001) 
-0.00002 
(0.00001)    -0.0000004 
(0.0000003)   
dividends as a share of AGI  -0.235 
(0.189) 
-0.237 
(0.189)    -0.006 
(0.004)*   
capital gains as a share of AGI  0.171 
(0.100)* 
0.173 
(0.100)*    0.004 
(0.002)**   
percentage married  -0.025 
(0.100) 
-0.029 
(0.103)    -0.0003 
( 0.002)   




















change of unemployment rate from 












2  0.691 0.691 0.688  0.872  0.871 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Regressions contain 1056 observations on 48 continental states.  All regressions include state and year effects.  
Log regressions include the log of the tax price. 
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Table 20.  Non-Deductible Tax and Fee Regressions 
   Ratio Specification  Logarithmic Specification 
 All  Restricted  All  Restricted 
   OLS IV  IV  IV  IV 
















































AGI Variance  0.000001 
(0.000008) 
0.000002 
(0.000008)    0.00000004 
(0.0000002)   
AGI Skew  -0.000005 
(0.00001) 
-0.000007 
(0.00002)    -0.0000001 
(0.0000004)   
dividends as a share of AGI  1.113 
(0.221)*** 
1.126 
(0.224)***    0.020 
(.006)***   
capital gains as a share of AGI  -0.098 
0.117 
-0.113 
0.119    0.001 
(0.003)   
percentage married  0.035 
0.117 
0.086 
0.122    0.002 
(0.003)   




















change of unemployment rate from 












2 0.800  0.796  0.785  0.948  0.946 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Regressions contain 1056 observations on 48 continental states.  All regressions include state and year effects.  
Log regressions include the log of the tax price.   35
Table 21.  Own Source Revenue Regressions 
   Ratio Specification  Logarithmic Specification 
 All  Restricted  All  Restricted 
   OLS IV  IV  IV  IV 












































AGI Variance  0.00001 
(0.00001) 
0.00001 
(0.00001)    0.00000006 
(0.00000005)   
AGI Skew  -0.00003 
(0.00002) 
-0.00003 
(0.00002)    -0.0000001 
(0.0000001)   
dividends as a share of AGI  0.878 
(0.269)*** 
0.889 
(0.271)***    0.005 
(0.002)***   
capital gains as a share of AGI  0.073 
(0.143) 
0.059 
( 0.144)    0.001 
(0.001)   
percentage married  0.010 
(0.143) 
0.056 
( 0.148)    -0.001 
(0.001)   




















change of unemployment rate from 












2 0.440  0.433  0.419  0.988  0.988 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Regressions contain 1056 observations on 48 continental states.  All regressions include state and year effects.  
Log regressions include the log of the tax price. 
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Figure 3 
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